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Hugo Black and Judicial 
Lawinaking: Forty Years 
in Retrospect 
Paul R. Baier* 
I. Law and Media Converge 
Forty years ago, law and media con­
verged in spectacular fashion. I am refer­
ring to Hugo Black's 1968 television 
interview on the Court and the Constitu­
tion, "Justice Black and the Bill of 
Rights." This was the first television in­
terview in history with a sitting Supreme 
Court Justice. The interview aired on 
December 3rd, 1968. The American peo­
ple heard Justice Black's mellifluous Ala­
bama voice decrying judges legislating 
from the bench. He recalled his New 
Deal days when the Court was turning its 
back on the Congress: "We had a Court 
that took out of this little word 'due pro­
cess' a meaning that they could pass on 
the economic affairs of this Nation, what 
the policies should be." Hugo Black viv­
idly recalled the dangers of due process, 
where the Old Court in Jay Burns Baking 
Company u. Bryan struck down a Ne­
braska law regulating the size ofloaves of 
bread1. Listen to him for yourself: 
But the Court was holding that-it had 
actually held and struck down a law of the 
State of Nebraska, where the people out 
there found that the bakers were trim­
ming the size of their loaves of bread and 
they dared to have an interest out there in 
seeing that consumers of bread were not 
cheated that way. And they passed a law 
regulating the size of a loaf of bread. 
Court comes along, says, "You can't do 
that!" ''That violates due process!" "Con­
trary to the fundamental principles of 
human nature!" "Shocks my conscience!" 
'' George M. Armstrong, Jr., Professor of Law, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Louisiana State University. 
Editor, MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. BLACK: THE MEMOIRS OF Huoo L. BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK (Random House 
1986). Judicial Fellow, Supreme Court of the United States, 1975-76. Executive Director, Louisiana 
Commission on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 1987-1991. Scholar-in-Residence, 
Louisiana Bar Foundation, 1990-'92. I want to thank my friend and Dean Emeritus of Chapman University 
School of Law Parham H. Williams, Jr., for his words of encouragement and confidence that I would make a 
good speaker at a Chapman's symposium on bench legislation and the right of privacy. 
1. 264 U.S. 504 (1924). 
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1 I" ''Violates the freedom of contract c ause. 
And anything else. 
As a Senator, Hugo Black supported 
President Franklin Roosevelt's Court­
packing plan. "I was for changing the 
Court as the Constitution permits, any­
way it permits, in order to get rid of a ma­
jority who would strike down such laws." 
Nobody could say it violated the Constitu­
tion, honestly. They might say, as they 
say about some of 'em, it violated "impal­
pable emanations from penumbras con­
nected with certain [laughing], certain 
amendments." But I don't know anything 
about those penumbras and emanations. 
All I go by, is I'm foolish enough to look at 
the words. 
In contrast to the vagary of due pro­
cess used by the Court to strike down 
economic regulation, Justice Black cham­
pioned the First Amendment as an abso­
lute. For Justice Black, "Congress shall 
make no law" means, "Congress shall 
make no law."2 That's it. No ifs, ands, or 
buts. Listen to his mighty Alabama voice 
once more, from the sound recording of 
his television interview, by way of a final 
word of introduction to my remarks: 
2. U.S.CoNST. amend. I. 
Our system of government puts different 
people on the Court, people with different 
views. I think it's their business to try to 
read these words-as silly as it may 
sound to some people. Some people have 
said that I'm either a knave or a fool, be· 
cause, if I was not dishonest, I couldn't 
say that there are absolutes. Well I just 
don't agree with them, I think I can and 
do. 
II. Forty Years in Retrospect 
I first saw Hugo Black's television in­
terview while helping Elizabeth Black 
with her memoirs. We viewed a film copy 
together at the Library of Congress. I 
recommend this television interview to 
you. It adds life to our learning.3 In this 
article, I propose to look back forty years 
and see how Hugo Black's views have 
held up. On the current Court, Justice 
Scalia is a worthy echo of Justice Black's 
faith in the Bill of Rights. But on sub­
stantive due process and privacy rights, 
I'm obliged to tell you that the Court has 
gone way beyond Hugo Black and 
Antonin Scalia's boundary lines.4 
3. I have long advocated the use of film, video tape, and sound recordings of Supreme Court arguments in teaching constitutional law. This includes Hugo Black's television interview, and one I did with Erwin N. Griswold, "A Life Lived Greatly in the Law" (WLSU TV, 1980). See Paul R. Baier, What Is the Use of a Law Book Without Pictures or Conversations?, 34 J. LEGAL Eouc. 619 (1984). For details of my television produc­tion with Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan, dual biography come to life, so to speak, see 0. W. Wollen­sak, Hugo
. 
Lafayette Black and John Marshall Harlan: Two Faces of Constitutional Law-With Some Notes on the Teaching of Thayer's Subject, 9 S.U. L. REV. 1 (1982). 4. Of 
.course, �he California Supreme Court, 4-3, has also surpassed Hugo Black and Antonin Scalia's boun�ary Imes, while at the same time confirming Justice Scalia's fear of judicial imposition of homosexual 
�arnage. See In re Ma�riage .Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 183 P.3d 384 (2008); Lawrence v. Texas, �39 U.S. 558• o4 (2003) (Sc�ha, J., dissentmg). The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, per Chief Justice Marga�et Mar�hall, earlier held that the individual liberty and equality safeguards of the Massachusetts Constitution requir� the Gene�al Court to afford same-sex couples equal liberty of civil marriage, again by a vote of 4 to 3· Goodridge v.
_
Dep t. Pub. Health, 440 Mass. 309, 798 N.E.2d 941 (2003). 
. I ha:e discoursed at length, with proof of claim on this eternal theme of the proper boundaries of constitu· bona! adJudication. See Paul R. B aier, The Supre
:ne Court, Justinian, and Antonin Scalia: Twenty Years in Retrospect, 67 LA. L. REv. 489 (2007). 
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The Supreme Court of the United 
States, before and since Hugo L. Black, 
has always legislated from the bench. 
"Bench legislation"-never mind Hugo 
Black or Antonin Scalia, never mind 
Plato or Aristotle, never mind Justinian 
or Napoleon-is inherent in saying what 
the law is. This is especially true in con­
stitutional law. Over time the Court has 
always given meaning to the Constitu­
tion's spacious expressions-"liberty;" 
"due process;" "equal protection;" " free­
dom of speech, or of the press;" "unrea­
sonable searches and seizures;" "cruel 
and unusual punishments." Signifi­
cantly, the black ink of the Constitution 
says nothing about judicial review. John 
Marshall wrote it into our basic law in 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 the year of the 
Louisiana Purchase, 1803. Come to think 
of it, the Constitution says nothing about 
expanding the boundaries of the United 
States by real estate transactions with 
5. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
foreign sovereigns. Yet I can affirm that 
Louisiana is a part of the Union today. 
Never mind President Jefferson's consti­
tutional qualms about the purchase. 
The Constitution says nothing about 
remedies for violations of constitutional 
rights. It says nothing about the right to 
get married, to study the German lan­
guage, to use condoms, to enjoy sexual re­
lations in the privacy of the home. And, 
of course, as Justice Scalia insisted in his 
own television interview the other day on 
CBS's 60 Minutes with Lesley Stahl, the 
Constitution says nothing about abor­
tion.6 
Surely law faculty and students alike 
have heard of Meyer v. Nebraska.7 So far 
as I know, it has not been overruled. The 
word "liberty" in the Fourteenth A mend­
ment is not self-defining. The Court de­
fines it. So it has been. So it will be. Roe 
v. Wade,8 Lawrence v. Texas,9 Roper v. 
Simmons 10-"Bench Legislation?" Sure.11 
6. Interview with Justice Antonin Scalia, United States Supreme Court Justice, CBS 60 minutes, in New 
York, NY. (Sept, 14, 2008). 
7. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
8. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
9. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
10. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
11. "To label the court's role as usurping that of the Legislature is to misunderstand the nature and 
purpose of judicial review. We owe great deference to the Legislature to decide social and policy issues, but it is 
the traditional and settled role of courts to decide constitutional issues." Goodridge v. Dep't. Pub. Health, 798 
N.E.2d at 966 (Marshall, C.J.). Justice Spina, joined by Sosman and Cordy, JJ., disagrees: "Today, the court 
has transformed it role as protector of individual rights into the role of creator of rights." Id. at 97 4 (dissenting 
opinion). And more: "While the courageous efforts of many have resulted in increased dignity, rights, and 
respect for gay and lesbian members of our community, the issue presented here is a profound one, deeply 
rooted in social policy, that must, for now, be the subject of legislative not judicial action." Id. at 1005 (Cordy, 
J., joined by Spina and Sosman, JJ., dissenting). 
You see the same competing judicial visions in the California Supreme Court's Marriage Cases, supra 
note 3, viz.: 
[W]e agree with the Attorney General and the Governor that the separation-of-po w ers doctrine pre­
cludes a court from "redefining" marriage on he basis of the court's view that public policy or the 
public interest would be better served by such a revision, [but] we disagree with the Attorney Gen­
eral and the Governor to the extent they suggest that the traditional or long-standing n ature of the 
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I have no trepidation in saying so. Hugo 
Black, I'm sure, would welcome table talk 
about "bench legislation," even from 
those who disagree with him. This is es­
pecially true on February 27th, which 
happens to be Hugo Black's birthday. 
"Born February 27, 1886, in the middle of 
Grover Cleveland's first term as Presi­
dent, I am today e ighty-two years and 
three months old. I have now been an As­
sociate Justice of the Supreme Court of 
the United States for thirty years and 
nine months."12 This is how Hugo Black 
began writing his memoirs in May of 
1968, the year of his television interview. 
The year of his birth, 1886, is the year the 
Statue of Liberty came into New York 
Harbor. Thank God it still stands. 
Thank God for Hugo L. Black. 
Ever since I first heard his lyrical 
voice and saw him on film reading his im­
mortal Chambers13 opinion-his aged 
hands clutching the United States Re­
ports- I have admired him, without 
stint. But on penumbras and emana­
tions, on privacy and due process, on the 
First Amendment as an absolute, I just 
don't agree with him. That is my opinion. 
For the rest, I will explain why by taking 
a few examples. 
III. Of Penumbras and Privacy 
Hugo Black scoffed at the idea of 
"penumbras" and "impalpable emana­
tions." When he made his television 
statement, he undoubtedly had Justice 
Douglas's opinion of the Court in Gris· 
wold v. Connecticut in mind.14 During 
the oral argument, Hugo Black vigor­
ously pressed Thomas Emerson, a Yale 
Law School professor, on his due process 
claim: 
JusTICE BLACK: It seems to me what 
someone has done here deliberately is to 
current statutory definition of marriage exempts the statutory provisions embodying that definition 
from the constraints imposed by the California Constitution, or that the separation-of-powers doc· 
trine precludes a court from determining that constitutional question. On the contrary, under "the 
constitutional theory of 'checks and balances' that the separation-of-powers doctrine is intended to 
serve," a court has an obligation to enforce the limitations that the California Constitution imposes upon legislative measures, and a court would shirk the responsibility it owes to each member of the public were it to consider such statutory provisions t o  be insulated from judicial review. 
This from Chief Justice Ronald George, joined by Kennard, Werdegar, and Moreno, JJ., 183 P.3d at 448 (em­phasis in original; citation omitted). 
Not so at all, according to the dissenting justices: "[A] bare majority of this court, not satisfied with the pace of democratic change, now abruptly forestalls that process and substitutes, by judicial fiat, its own social policy views for those expressed by the People themselves." Id. at 457 (Baxter, J., joined by Chin, J., dissent­ing). "If such a profound change in this ancient social institution is to occur, the People and their representa· tives, who represent the public conscience, should have the right, and the responsibility, to control the pace of that change through the democratic process . . . The majority's decision erroneously usurps it." Id. at 468. "Four votes on this court should not disturb the balance reached by the democratic process, a balance that is still being tested in the political arena." Corrigan, J., Id. at 471. "If there is to be a new understanding of the meaning of marriage in California, it should develop among the people of our state and find its expression at the ballot box." Id. 
12. Huao L. BLACK & ELIZABETH BLACK, MR. JusTICE AND MRs. BLAcK: THE MEMOIRS oF Huco L. BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLAcK 3 (Paul R. Baier ed., Random House 1986). 13. Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227 (1940). 14. 381 U.S. 479, 481-87 (1965). 
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try to force a decision on the broadest pos­
sible meaning of due process, speaking as 
a matter of substance, and to have us 
weigh facts and circumstances as to the 
advisability of a law like this, rather than 
leaving it up to the legislature .... 
You pitch it wholly on due process, with 
the broad idea that we can look to see how 
reasonable or unreasonable the decision of 
the people of Connecticut has been in con­
nection with this statute. 
MR. EMERSON: We pitch it on due process 
in the basic sense, yes, that it is arbitrary 
and unreasonable, and in the special 
sense that it constitutes a deprivation of 
right against invasion of privacy. The pri­
vacy argument is a substantially nar­
rower one than the general argument. 
JusTICE BLACK: That's a due process argu­
ment? 
Ma. EMERSON: That's correct. They're both 
due process; they're both due process.15 
Trying to escape Hugo Black's 
clutches, Mr. Emerson hurriedly distin­
guishes Lochner u. New York and re­
minds the Court of Meyer u. Nebraska: 
Ma. EMERSON: But it i s  not broad due pro­
cess in the sense in which the issue was 
raised in the 1930s. In the first place, this 
is not a regulation that deals with eco­
nomic or commercial matters. It is a regu­
lation that touches upon individual rights: 
the right to protect life and health, the 
right of advancing scientific knowledge, 
the right to have children voluntarily. 
And therefore, we say w e  are not asking 
this Court to revive Lochner against New 
York, or to overrule Nebbia or West Coast 
Hotel. 
JusTrcE BLACK: It sounds to me like you're 
asking us to follow the constitutional phi­
losophy of that case. 
MR. EMERSON: No, Your Honor, we are 
not. We are asking you to follow the phi-
losophy of Meyer against Nebraska and 
Pierce against the Society of Sisters, 
which dealt with-Meyer against Ne­
braska-
JUSTICE BLACK: That's the one that held it 
was unconstitutional, as I recall it, for a 
state to try to regulate the size ofloaves of 
bread-
MR. EMERSON: No, no, no-
JusTICE BLACK: -because people were be­
ing defrauded; was that it? 
MR. EMERSON: That w as the Lochner case, 
Your Honor . .. . 16 
The Nebraska case Justice Black has 
in mind is not Lochner u. New York, 17 not 
at all. Both the Justice and the Professor 
are all mixed up. The case is our old 
friend Jay Burns Baking Company v. 
Bryan .18 Be that as it may, Elizabeth 
Black was in the wives' box when her 
husb and announced his dissent in Gris­
wold u. Connecticut19 from the bench, 
taking the Court to task for its errant 
ways. Elizabeth recorded in her diaries, 
"Hugo was eloquent. Wish everybody 
could have heard him. I t hink it will be 
one of his great dissents!"20 She was 
right. Judge for yourself:-
The Court talks about a constitutional 
"right of privacy'' as though there is some 
constitutional provision or provisions for­
bidding any law ever to be passed which 
might abridge the "privacy" of individuals. 
But there is not. 
I get nowhere in this case by talk about a 
constitutional "right to privacy" as an em­
anation from one o r  more constitutional 
provisions. I like my privacy as well as 
the next one, but I am nevertheless com­
pelled to admit that the government has a 
15. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 411-12 (1923). 
16.  Id. 
17. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
18. 264 U.S. 504 (1924). 
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
20. MR HUGO L. BLACK & ELIZABETH BLACK, MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. BLACK: THE MEMOIRS OF HUGO L. 
BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK 116 (Paul R. Baier ed., Random House 1986). 
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right to invade it unless prohibited by 
some specific constitutional provision.21 
Having dispatched the Court's reli­
ance on the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, 
and Ninth Amendments-all the hodge­
podge of Justice Douglas's majority opin­
ion-Justice Black put his dagger into 
Justice Harlan's due p rocess nonsense: 
I do not believe we are granted power by 
the Due Process Clause or any other con­
stitutional provision or provisions to mea­
sure constitutionality by our belief that 
legislation is arbitrary, capricious or un­
reasonable, or accomplishes no justifiable 
purpose, or is offensive to our own notions 
of "civilized standards of conduct." Such 
an appraisal of the wisdom of legislation 
is an attribute of the power to make laws, 
not the power to interpret them.22 
Measured by Hugo Black's ruler, 
Griswold u. Connecticut23 is pure "bench 
legislation." Measured by m y  lights, it is 
sound constitutional law. Why? Because 
I believe the Court is right to say that the 
Fourth Amendment is aimed by its black 
letter-and, beyond, by its spirit-at pro­
tecting "the sanctity of a man's home and 
the privacies of life."24 The Court said ex­
actly this the very month, the very year 
Hugo Black came into this world-Febru­
ary, 1886. I mean Boyd u. United 
States-"a case that will be remembered 
as long as civil liberty lives in the United 
States."25 This is what Justice Brandeis 
said about it. Boyd is a short answer to 
Justice Black's book of Substantive Due 
Process, as I teach them both in class. 
There is nothing ironic, however, in 
Justice Black's following the Boyd doc­
trine himself, in his concurring opinion in 
Mapp u. Ohio, 26 which found a constitu­
tional basis for the exclusionary rule. 
"[W]hen the Fourth Amendment's ban on 
unreasonable searches and seizures is 
considered together with the Fifth 
Amendment's ban against compelled self­
incrimination, a constitutional basis 
emerges which not only justifies but actu­
ally requires the exclusionary rule," said 
Justice Black.21 
[I)t seems to me that the Boyd doctrine, 
though perhaps not required by the ex­
press language of the Constitution strictly 
construed, is amply justified from an his­
torical standpoint soundly based in rea­
son, and entirely consistent with what I 
regard to be the proper approach to inter­
pretation of our Bill of Rights-an ap­
proach well set out by Mr. Justice Bradley 
in the Boyd case: 
"(C]onstitutional provisions for the 
security of person and property 
should be liberally construed. A close 
and literal construction deprives 
them of half their efficacy, and leads 
to a gradual depreciation of the right, 
as if it consisted more in sound than 
in substance. It is the duty of the 
courts to be watchful for the constitu­
tional rights of the citizen, and 
against any stealthy encroachments 
thereon."28 
21. 
22. 
23. 
24. 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 509-510 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting). Id. at 513. 
Id. 
Id. at 485. 
�5 .. 116 U.S. 616 (1886) (per Justice Joseph P. Bradley, a forgotten, but vital figure of Nineteenth Cen-tury Jurisprudence). ' 
26. 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961). 
27. Id. 
28. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 662-663 (1961). 
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Justice Bradley's Boyd doctrine, an­
nounced in 1886, the year of Hugo Black's 
birth, is a constitutional birthright of all 
Americans. The exclusionary rule, I sub­
mit, is not the Warren Court legislating 
from the bench. Not at all. 
Justice Holmes, say it softly, had 
trouble making up his mind on this "pe­
numbra" business. Recall Olmstead u. 
United States, where the Court held that 
eavesdropping by wire-tapping a bootleg­
ger's telephone line did not amount to a 
search or seizure within the meaning of 
the Fourth Amendment.29 Chief Justice 
Taft wrote the opinion of the Court. In 
his dissent, Holmes deferred to Justice 
Brandeis's "exhaustive . . examination [of 
the case]," desiring only "to add but a few 
words."30 Today, the Justices write 
tomes. I prefer Holmes's crisp legal 
prose. Justice Black's prose style is pure 
gold. Here are Holmes's few words: 
"While I do not deny it I am not prepared 
to say that the penumbra of the Fourth 
and Fifth Amendments covers the defen­
dant, although I fully agree that Courts 
are apt to err by sticking too closely to the 
words of a law where those words import 
a policy that goes beyond them."31 
Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olm­
stead, like Boyd, is a living oracle of civil 
liberties. It soars beyond the text of the 
Fourth and Fifth Amendments, to the 
aims of the makers of our Constitution 
and our Bill of Rights: 
29. 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928). 
30. Id. at 469 (Holmes J., dissenting). 
31. Id. 
32. ld. at 478 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). 
33. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). 
34. Id. at 353. 
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The makers of our Constitution undertook 
to secure conditions favorable to the pur­
suit of happiness. They recognized the 
significance of man's spiritual nature, of 
his feelings and of his intellect. They 
knew that only a part of the pain, plea­
sure and satisfactions of life are to be 
found in material things. They sought to 
protect Americans in their beliefs, their 
thoughts, their emotions and their sensa­
tions. They conferred, as against the gov­
ernment, the right to be let alone-the 
most comprehensive of rights and the 
right most valued by civilized men. To 
protect that right, every unjustifiable in­
trusion by the government upon the pri­
vacy of the individual, whatever the 
means employed, must be deemed a viola­
tion of the Fourth Amendment. 32 
Olmstead, of course, has been over­
ruled. The Court came to its senses in 
Katz u. United States ,33 departing from 
Olmstead's "narrow view." This was 
1967, a year before Justice Black's televi­
sion interview. "Once it is recognized 
that the Fourth Amendment protects 
people-and not simply 'areas'-against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, it 
becomes clear that the reach of that 
Amendment cannot turn upon the pres­
ence or absence of a p hysical intrusion 
into any given enclosure," said Justice 
Potter Stewart for the Court.34 
I have always a dmired Justice Stew­
art's constitutional sensibility. True, he 
joined Justice Black's dissent in Griswold 
NEXUS 
v. Connecticut.35 But later, he voted with 
the majority in Roe v. Wade, 36 explaining 
his change of mind on due process 
grounds: "Clearly, therefore, the Court 
today is correct in holding that the right 
asserted by Jane Roe is embraced within 
the personal liberty protected by the Due 
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment. "37 
The line from Olmstead to Katz, from 
Griswold to Roe, is not "bench legisla­
tion" as I understand the duty of the 
Court. Others are of the same view. You 
may have heard of Justice Anthony Ken­
nedy. His opinion in Lawrence v. Texas38 
is the latest chapter in the Court's book of 
privacy rights. Neither Hugo Black nor 
Antonin Scalia subscribes to such judicial 
lawmaking.39 They would say Roe v. 
Wade is a prodigy of Lochner v. New 
York. Ironically, after the Roe decision, 
our protagonist Hugo Black, was accused 
of "murdering babies" in ignorant letters 
addressed to him after his death, mind 
you, dutifully carried by the Marshal of 
the Court to Justice Harry A. Blackmun's 
chambers. 
Justice Black, take note, adamantly 
dissented in Katz. He was all alone, 8 to 
1, in this eavesdropping case. He wound 
u p  his dissent in Katz in a tight para­
graph that is pure Hugo Black: 
In interpreting the Bill of Rights, I will­
ingly go as far as a liberal construction of 
the language takes me, but I simply can­
not in good conscience give a meaning to 
words which they have never before been 
thought to have and which they certainly 
do not have in common ordinary usage. I 
will not distort the words of the Amend­
ment in order to "keep the Constitution up 
to date" or "to bring i t  into harmony with 
the times." It was never meant that this 
Court have such power, which in effect 
would make us a continuously functioning 
constitutional convention. 40 
After Katz, the Court has continued 
to build upon Boyd's cornerstone, never 
mind Hugo Black's dissent. For example, 
Justice Scalia, building upon Boyd, has 
held that thermal imaging by the govern­
ment of a man's home where marijuana 
plants are growing in the attic invades a 
35. 381 U.S. 479, 507 (1965) (Black, J., and Stewart, J., dissenting). 
36. 410 U.S. 113, (1973). 
37. Id. at 170 (Stewart, Jr., concurring). "[l]t was clear to m e  then, and it is equally clear to me now, that 
the Griswold decision can be rationally understood only as a holding that the Connecticut statute substan­
tively invaded the "liberty" that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Id. at 167-68. 
38. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
39. Both share the restraining philosophy of Plato: "It is the Laws which govern-not the philosophical Artists of King-Craft." George Grote, 3 PLATO AND OTHER COMPANIONS OF SOCRATES 310 (1865). I am quoting from Hugo Black's personal copy of Grote's Plato, w hich includes Justice Black's hand-written index, his notes, and his underscorings on the end papers of the book, e.g.: "LAWS-Not MEN provided for Government in DeLegibus . ... 'Fixed laws'-Judges and Magistrates must be servants of the law 310." Accord, Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 379 (1989) (Scalia, J.) ("[T]o say and mean that, is to replace judges of the law with a committee of philosopher-kings."). "The courts are given power to interpret the Constitution and laws, which means to explain and expound, not to alter, amend, or remake. Judges take an oath to support the Constitu­tion as it is, not as they think it should be." Hugo L. Black, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 20-21 (1968) (revised version of three lectures delivered at Columbia University Law School by Justice Black in the James D. Car­pentier Series, March 1968). 
40. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 373 (Black, J., dissenting ). 
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reasonable expectation of privacy and 
constitutes a search within the meaning 
of the Fourth Amendment.41 As I said, 
Justice Scalia is an echo of Hugo Black, 
and more. 
IV. "Beyond A Reasonable 
Doubt" 
In re Winship holds that the Consti­
tution requires proof "beyond a reasona­
ble doubt" of all the elements of a 
criminal offense. 42 This was the work of 
Justice Brennan, who wrote the foreword 
to Hugo Black's memoirs. What did Jus­
tice Black say about proof beyond a rea­
sonable doubt in the dissent? I quote him 
precisely: 
[N)owhere in [the Constitution) is there 
any statement that conviction of crime re­
quires proof of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt. I believe the Court has no power to 
add to or subtract from procedures set 
forth by the Founders. I realize that it is 
far easier to substitute individual judges' 
ideas of "fairness" for the fairness pre­
scribed by the Constitution, but I shall not 
at any time surrender my belief that that 
document itself should be our guide, not 
our own concept of what is fair, decent, 
and right. As I have said time and time 
again, I prefer to put my faith in the 
words of the written Constitution itself 
rather than to rely on the shifting, day-to­
day standards of fairness of individual 
judges.43 
As much as I admire Hugo Black, let 
me say it plainly: I subscribe to Justice 
Brennan's view, not to Hugo Black's. 
And as far as I am concerned, such con-
41. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
42. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
43. Id. at 377-378 (Black, J., dissenting). 
44. United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310 (1990). 
stitutional construction is not to be out­
lawed as "bench legislation." 
V. Freedom of Speech 
Justice Black drew hard lines be­
tween "speech" and "conduct." Flag burn­
ing comes to mind. The American people 
know that the Court reversed a criminal 
conviction for dousing a n  American flag 
with kerosene, setting it afire, while fel­
low protestors chanted, "America, the 
red, white, and blue, we spit on you." 
Congress passed the Flag Protection Act, 
but it was promptly struck down, 5 to 4, 
in another of Justice B rennan's First 
Amendment benchmarks.44 
Hugo Black announced a contrary 
view twenty years before: 
It passes my belief that anything in the 
Federal Constitution bars a State from 
making the deliberate burning of the 
American flag an offense. It is immaterial 
to me that words are spoken in connection 
with the burning. It is the burning of the 
flag that the State has set its face 
against. . . . The t alking that was done 
took place "as an integral part of conduct 
in violation of a valid criminal statute" 
against burning the American flag in pub­
lic. I would therefore affirm this convic­
tion. 45 
The same year, 1969, Justice Black 
blasted the Court for holding that school 
boards could not ban students in school 
from wearing black arm bands to protest 
the Vietnam War.46 Elizabeth Black was 
in the wives' box and heard her husband 
45. Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 610 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting). 
46. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969). 
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announce his dissent. She recorded in 
her diaries that Hugo's blistering opinion 
was about twenty-five minutes long: "I 
was on the edge of my chair, hands and 
feet like ice, and the brethren in various 
stages of shock."47 The following con­
nected passages indicate what it was like 
at Court:-
The Court's holding in this case ushers in 
what I deem to be an entirely new era in 
which the power to control pupils by the 
elected "officials of state supported public 
schools . . ."in the United States is in ul­
timate effect transferred to the Supreme 
Court. The original idea of schools, which 
I do not believe is yet abandoned as 
worthless or out of date, was that children 
had not yet reached the point of experi­
ence and wisdom which enabled them to 
teach all of their elders. Change has been 
said to be truly the law of life but some­
times the old and the tried and true are 
worth holding. School discipline, like pa­
rental discipline, is an integral and impor­
tant part of training our children to be 
good citizens-to be better citizens. This 
case, therefore, wholly without constitu­
tional reasons in my judgment, subjects 
all the public schools in the country to the 
whims and caprices of their loudest­
mouthed, but maybe not their brightest, 
students.48 
It may please you to hear that the 
Robert's Court has come around to Hugo 
Black's view. The First Amendment is no 
warrant for the Supreme Court to run the 
public schools of this country. I have in 
mind the "BONG HITS 4 JESUS" case.49 
Chief Justice Roberts's majority opinion 
sided with high school Principal Deborah 
Morse. The Court rejected the First 
Amendment claim of Joseph Frederick, 
who testified he unfurled his banner be­
cause he wanted to get on television.50 
Justice Black, if I may speak for him, 
ld "Am " wou say, en. 
VI. Chambers v. Florida 
On his television interview, Hugo 
Black read from his opinion in Chambers 
v. Florida.51 It came early in Justice 
Black's tenure on the Court, February 12, 
1940, Lincoln's birthday. According to 
Justice Black's meaning, the Due Process 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
guarantees that before the doors of a 
prison close shut on a man, the govern­
ment must follow the law-"clear laws, 
as written, not a natural law ."In criminal 
cases, Hugo Black's Bible is the Bill of 
Rights. His unanimous opinion for the 
Court in Chambers came before his ex­
tended analysis of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's history in his landmark 
dissent in Adamson v. California.52 
Thereafter, the Bill of Rights guided his 
judgment and he followed its procedural 
protections to the letter, without any 
weighing and balancing away of its abso­
lutes. 
But in Chambers, the Fifth Amend­
ment had not yet been held applicable to 
the States. All Hugo Black had to fall 
back on was the Due Process Clause of 
47. MR HUGO L. BLACK & ELIZABETH BLACK, MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. BLACK: THE MEMOIRS OF HUGO L. 
BLACK AND ELIZABETH BLACK 2 1 7  (Paul R. Baier ed., Random House 1986). 
48. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 525. 
49. Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007). 
50. Id. at 2623. 
51. 309 U.S. 22 7 (1940). 
52. 332 U.S. 46 (1947). 
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the Fourteenth Amendment. Justice 
Black's Chambers opinion, therefore, 
shows how history shapes the law of the 
Constitution. Text alone is never enough, 
not even for Hugo Black. Chambers v. 
Florida is a good example. 
Hugo Black loved to read legal his­
tory-Greek, Roman, English, American. 
He knew Plato's Laws53 and Aristotle's 
Rhetoric.54 He spoke of Tacitus, John 
Lilburne, and Jam es Madison as though 
they were his neighbors in Old Town Al­
exandria, Virginia, where he lived hap­
pily with Elizabeth, played tennis, and 
wrote out his opinions in long-hand. 
The Chambers draft is a treasure of 
the Hugo Black Papers at the Library of 
Congress. A printed copy of the draft cir­
culated to members of the Court at the 
time carries Chief Justice Hughes's hand­
written annotation on his return to Jus­
tice Black, "Clear as a bell." 
With my students I have compiled a 
little book of digests of Supreme Court 
opinions called The Pocket Constitution­
alist, 55 named after Justice Black's prac­
tice of always carrying a copy of the 
Constitution in his pocket. The book is 
dedicated to the memory of Hugo L. 
Black and Elizabeth Black-"friends of 
the Constitution." Chambers v. Florida 
is the first digest in the book. It gives you 
the essentials of the case, in Hugo Black's 
own words, quoted precisely in tight 
paragraphs without the distraction of el­
lipses. Here is his opening: 
The grave question presented by the peti­
tion for certiorari, granted in forma 
pauperis, is whether proceedings in which 
confessions were utilized, and which 
culminated in sentences of death upon 
four young negro men in the State of Flor­
ida, failed to afford the safeguard of that 
due process of law guaranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment.56 
Chambers and the others had been 
rounded up by a police dragnet on suspi­
cion alone, subjected to protracted ques­
t ioning in a fourth floor jail room, "under 
circumstances calculated to break the 
strongest nerves and stoutest resis­
tance."57 
"Sunrise confessions," as Hugo Black 
called them, were used to convict and 
sentence Chambers and his fellows to 
death. Reversing, Justice Black recited 
the history of the constitutional require­
ment of due process:-
Tyrannical governments had immemori­
ally utilized dictatorial criminal procedure 
and punishment to make scapegoats of 
the weak, or of helpless p olitical, religious, 
or racial minorities and those who dif­
fered, who would not conform and who re­
sisted tyranny. Thus, as assurance 
against ancient evils, our country, in or­
der to preserve "the blessings of liberty," 
wrote into its basic law the requirement, 
among others, that the forfeiture of the 
lives, liberties or property of people ac­
cused of crime can only follow if procedu-
53. Thomas L. Pangle, The Laws of Plato, Translated, with Notes and an Interpretive Essay, (Basic 
Books 1980) (360 B.C.) available at http://books.google.com/books?id=aMK-acwwy7kC&printsec=titlepage# 
PPPl,Ml. 
54. Aristotle. On Rhetoric (George A. Kennedy trans., Oxford University Press 1991) (367 B.C.), availa-
ble at http://etext.library.adelaide.edu.au/a/aristotle/a8rh/. 
55. Paul R. Baier, The Pocket Constitutionalist (5th ed. Claitor's Publishing Division) (2003). 
56. Chambers, 309 U.S. at 227. 
57. Id. at 239. 
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ral safeguards of due process have been 
obeyed. The rack, the thumbscrew, the 
wheel, solitary confinement, protracted 
questioning and cross questioning, and 
other ingenious forms of entrapment of 
the helpless or unpopular had left their 
wake of mutilated bodies and shattered 
minds along the way to the cross, the guil­
lotine, the stake and the hangman's 
noose.58 
Hugo Black's Chambers opm10n is 
cold steel. Here is the closing p art. Jus­
tice Black read it with great emotion on 
his television interview:-
Today, as in ages past, we are not without 
tragic proof that the exalted power of 
some governments to punish manufac­
tured crime dictatorially is the handmaid 
of tyranny. Under our constitutional sys­
tem, courts stand against any winds that 
blow as havens of refuge for those who 
might otherwise suffer because they are 
helpless, weak, outnumbered, or because 
they are non-conforming victims of 
prejudice and public excitement. Due pro­
cess of law, preserved for all by our Con­
stitution, commands that no such practice 
as that disclosed by this record shall send 
any accused to his death. No higher duty, 
no more solid responsibility, rests upon 
this Court, than translating into living 
law and maintaining this constitutional 
shield deliberately planned and inscribed 
for the benefit of every human being sub­
ject to our Constitution-of whatever 
race, creed, or persuasion.59 
After forty years Justice Black's faith 
still rings true. The current Supreme 
Court's rejection of the Executive's claim 
of authority to detain enemy combatants 
at Guantanamo without judicial over­
sight echoes the spirit of Hugo Black. His 
Chambers opinion will also be remem-
58. Id. at 236. 
59. Id. at 241. 
bered as long as civil liberty lives in the 
United States. 
VII. No Law Means No Law 
Let me conclude this retrospective 
with two letters that passed between 
Harvard Law School Dean Erwin N. Gris­
wold and Hugo Black. Dean Griswold 
wrote to Justice Black enclosing a lecture 
he was about to deliver criticizing Justice 
Black's views. The lecture is entitled, 
"Absolute Is In the Dark."60 He wrote to 
Hugo Black: "With trepidation, and with 
great respect, I am sending you herewith 
a copy of the Leary Lecture which I am 
giving in Salt Lake City on Wednesday 
evening, February 27th." 
What was Hugo Black's response? 
There was no reason at all for you to feel 
"trepidation" in sending me a copy of the 
lecture which you gave in Salt Lake City 
on February 27th. Perhaps that was a 
very appropriate time for you to give a lec­
ture about my philosophy since it hap­
pened to be my birthday. 
As you can guess, I disagree with most of 
the constitutional principles you advo­
cated in your lecture. As a matter of fact, 
I am of the opinion that you could not pos­
sibly think my constitutional philosophy 
is any more dangerous than I think is the 
constitutional philosophy you expressed 
in your lecture. Nevertheless, as I wrote 
to John Frank today, my admiration for 
you-and my respect for your sturdy in­
tegrity-are such that I am compelled to 
admit that your championship of your 
views causes me to hope that maybe they 
are not as dangerous as I still believe they 
are. Sometime, however, when we have 
time to talk, I would like to discuss with 
you some of the things you said because 
60. Erwin N. Griswold, Absolute Is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of the Supreme Court of 
the Supreme Court to Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L. REV. 167 (1963). 
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they indicated that you are not wholly fa­
miliar with the views I think I entertain. 
This does not mean that I have departed 
one iota from what I said in New York to 
the effect that I believe "no law" means 
"no law." 
With my very kindest regards to both you 
and Mrs. Griswold, I am 
Sincerely, 
Hugo L. Black 
Justice Black and Solicitor General 
Griswold met face to face in the Pentagon 
Papers case.61 The sound effects of the 
oral argument are spectacular. Their 
voices, their competing faiths, are pre­
served for untold future generations. But 
I must take my leave and close the book 
on this hurried retrospective of forty 
years. 
Happy birthday, Justice Black. 
. 61. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 7 1 3  (1971). Justice Black's separate concurring opin­IOn was his last. He emphatically rejected Solicitor General Griswold's argument that '"no' law does not mean 
'no' law." Justice Black quoted Dean Griswold's argument in his opinion, but he answered it by saying: "Both 
the history and language of the First Amendment support the view that the press must be left free to publish 
news, whatever the source, without censorship, injunctions, or prior restraints." Id. at 717 (emphasis added). 
What was Elizabeth Black's reaction? "Hugo's line 'foreign fevers and foreign shot and shell' was quoted on 
television. I went to his Hugo's office and told him, 'Honey, if this is your swan song it's a good one!' He agreed 
he could be proud of this one." MR. JUSTICE AND MRS. BLACK, supra note 5 at 266. It is to Elizabeth Black's 
memory that this little retrospective is dedicated. God bless her. 
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